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 COUNTRY STUDY PUBLISH ED BY TH E INTERNATIONAL POVERTY CENTRE 
 
GEARING PUBLIC FINANCE TO  GRO W TH , EM PLO YM ENT 
AND  PO VERTY  RED UCTIO N IN M O LD O VA 
 
Terry M cKinley∗ 
 
This Country Study w as part of a com prehensive UNDP-supported national report on 
Econom ic Policies for Grow th, Em ploym ent and Poverty Reduction in M oldova. This study 
focuses on analysing M oldova’s public finances, including m obilizing m ore dom estic revenue, 
reducing its external and dom estic debt and re-allocating its public expenditures. It counsels 
against low ering rates on direct taxes, w hich it predicts w ill be not only inequitable but also 
ineffectual; instead, it offers alternative recom m endations on how  to raise m ore revenue and 
m ake the tax system  m ore progressive. W hile com m ending the governm ent of M oldova for 
being able to unilaterally reduce its external debt burden, it sharply criticizes international 
donors for not having provided the country w ith concessional lending during the difficult 
transition years of the 1990s. H ad the country’s incom e per person been correctly calculated, it 
w ould have qualified for such lending and not been saddled w ith such an onerous debt 
burden. Lastly, the study recom m ends that the governm ent devote m ore resources to 
econom ic services, and public investm ent in general, in order to stim ulate a m ore rapid rate of 
grow th and em ploym ent generation and focus m ore econom ic resources on poor households. 
 
                                                 
∗ Senior Researcher and Acting Director, International Poverty Centre,  United Nations Developm ent Program m e. 
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1  INTRO D UCTIO N 
This Country Study exam ines the role of public finance in supporting a developm ent strategy  
for M oldova that w ould accelerate econom ic grow th, generate em ploym ent and direct 
resources tow ard poverty reduction. Although the governm ent of M oldova has already 
succeeded adm irably in reducing its external debt burden, its fiscal space w ill rem ain lim ited 
until it is able to refinance its rem aining m ultilateral and bilateral Paris Club debt. In order to do 
so, it needs greater cooperation from  its m ultilateral and bilateral creditors. Because of its ow n 
efforts to reduce its external debt, the governm ent is in a stronger position w hen it begins 
negotiations w ith these creditors.   
Independently of its debt problem , the governm ent has both the flexibility and the ability 
to expand its range of options.  In part, its success hinges on its ability to m obilize dom estic 
resources. It has already done a great deal to reform  its tax system , and m ore can be done to 
im prove revenue generation. Som e of the m ajor recom m endations of this study focus on w ays 
to increase revenue and m ake the structure of taxation m ore progressive. 
This Country Study also m akes recom m endations on the re-allocation of public expenditures. 
It argues that the governm ent should assign a larger share of public expenditures to econom ic 
services, and to public investm ent in econom ic infrastructure in particular. Since m uch of the 
country’s infrastructure has deteriorated, such investm ent is badly needed. M oreover, it could 
im part a significant stim ulus to econom ic grow th, because appropriately designed public 
investm ent can ‘crow d-in’ private investm ent. Public investm ent can also be used to focus m ore 
resources on econom ic services that disproportionately benefit poor households. This w ould be 
the case, for exam ple, for public investm ent in irrigation and rural roads. 
2  TH E M O BILIZATIO N O F D O M ESTIC REVENUE  
M obilizing tax revenue is crucial for im plem enting an investm ent-led Grow th and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy in M oldova. H ow ever, revenues of the consolidated budget w ere 24.2 per 
cent of GDP in 2003, dow n by about 25 per cent from  their highpoint of a third of GDP in 1997.  
M oreover, they are projected to decline further, to 22.5 per cent of GDP in 2007.  Expenditures 
in the consolidated budget have been reduced even m ore drastically than revenues, from  40.5 
per cent of GDP in 1997 to 22.7 per cent in 2003, a forty per cent decrease. During 2000-2002, 
the budget deficit ranged betw een zero and m inus one per cent of GDP.  In 2003, the budget 
ran a surplus of 1.6 per cent of GDP. Thus, the Governm ent has been im plem enting a relatively 
tight, if not contractionary, fiscal policy in recent years. 
At the sam e tim e that revenues are expected to decrease, contributions to social and 
m edical insurance are program m ed to increase. Contributions to state social insurance rose 
from  6.4 per cent of GDP in 1999 to 7.3 per cent in 2003, and are projected to increase steadily, 
reaching 8.3 per cent in 2007.  Contributions to m edical insurance w ere introduced in 2004, 
and are projected to be 1.1 per cent of GDP by 2007.1 The rise in total contributions to the tw o 
insurance funds projected for 2007 contrasts w ith the decline in other form s of tax revenues. 
Revenues for social protection are increasing but not revenues to finance other essential 
public functions, such as providing public services and infrastructure. 
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Increases in expenditures for social protection can be pro-poor and are badly needed. 
H ow ever, as long as the com bination of debt servicing and declines in tax revenue continues, 
public investm ent and the provision of essential public services w ill be constrained, as w ill the 
grow th of incom e and hum an developm ent. Further, sustained grow th of the econom y  
is critical for the financing of increased social protection. Although increases in current 
expenditure, such as on social and m edical insurance, can stim ulate aggregate dem and,  
they do not expand the productive capacity of the econom y.  
In 2004, non-tax revenues represented about 18 per cent of all revenue. H ow ever, they are 
projected to decline, from  6.4 per cent of GDP in 2004 to 5.7 per cent in 2007. The M inistry of 
Finance regards the decline as a desirable objective to stream line and rationalize the revenue 
system . These revenues arise from  an am algam  of various charges, such as road fees, charges 
for using state-ow ned tradem arks, fees for extracting natural resources, and paym ents for 
licenses. They also include net incom e from  the National Bank, w hich is variable from  year  
to year. H ow ever, if non-tax revenue is declining, then tax revenue should be boosted to 
com pensate for the decline. 
Like other countries, M oldova has been advised to increase its reliance on indirect taxes, 
m ainly the Value Added Tax. Indirect taxes now  account for about 42 per cent of all state 
revenue.  H ow ever, according to the M edium  Term  Expenditure Fram ew ork (M TEF), indirect 
taxes are projected to decline, as a ratio to GDP, from  15.2 per cent in 2003 to 13.8 per cent in 
2007.  The revenue generated from  the Value Added Tax, w hich accounts for about tw o thirds 
of all indirect taxes, should be on the rise if it is an efficient form  of taxation, but its revenue is 
projected to increase only m arginally.  These trends place an additional burden on direct taxes 
to raise revenue.  
Value added taxes are often recom m ended as a substitute for trade taxes. But a recent 
study of VAT taxation and trade liberalization (Baunsgaard and Keen 2004) finds that value 
added taxes have been successful in com pensating for the loss of trade taxes, as a result of 
trade liberalization, only in high incom e countries. M iddle-incom e countries have been able  
to com pensate for only about 45-60 percent of the revenue lost from  trade liberalization. The 
m ost troubling finding, how ever, is that the VAT in low  incom e countries has recovered, at 
m ost, only about 30 per cent of the revenue lost from  trade liberalization.  
The incidence of the VAT has shifted increasingly tow ards im ported goods and aw ay from  
dom estically produced goods. In 2003, VAT revenue on im ports w as 8.7 per cent of GDP, w hile 
the revenue from  dom estically produced goods w as 4.3 per cent. This w as a reversal of the 
situation in 1997, w hen the ratio for im ported goods w as 1.8 per cent and that for dom estic 
goods 8.8 per cent.  This is partly explained by a change in 1999 to a destination m ethod of 
VAT taxation, w hich w as applied to im ports from  CIS countries as w ell as others. H ow ever, 
there is a VAT refund provided on im ported goods. In 2003, for exam ple, total VAT refunds 
am ounted to 2.8 per cent of GDP.   
Com pared to trade taxes, sales taxes on dom estic goods and services are lim ited in  
their revenue-raising potential in an econom y w ith a large inform al sector. Another possible 
explanation for their inability to generate revenue is that the m inim um  threshold for obligatory 
registration of VAT taxpayers has been raised, purportedly to m ake it m ore efficient. 
A  2003 study of taxation in thirteen transition countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus 
and Central Asia found that in 2000 M oldova had a 10 percent effective VAT rate (i.e., actual 
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VAT collections as a ratio to the VAT base) (Stepanyan 2003, p. 15). This rate com pared 
favourably to those in other countries, especially Russia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, but, 
nonetheless, it had declined from  a high of seventeen percent in 1998. A  sim ilar trend 
characterized the VAT efficiency rate (the effective VAT rate as a ratio to the statutory rate):  
it had declined from  84 percent in 1998 to 52 percent in 2000. 
Because VAT is levied on im ports, foreign trade taxes have rem ained low , accounting,  
for exam ple, for only 1.7 per cent of GDP in 2003.  Part of the reason that VAT and trade taxes 
together are low  is the establishm ent of free trade arrangem ents w ith countries in Southeast 
Europe and the CIS.  Another part of the reason is that the Governm ent has refrained from  
raising som e im port tariffs, even though it is allow ed to do so under the W TO accession 
agreem ent. Average im port tariffs are reported to be 6.5 per cent. There are no tariffs or VAT 
taxes on exports. For the purposes of generating badly needed revenue, rather than for trade 
protection, som e im port tariffs could be raised m oderately w ithout violating W TO rules.  
The governm ent has attem pted to give the VAT a progressive structure by setting three 
rates below  the standard tw enty per cent.  These are:  eight per cent for bread and dairy 
products, five per cent for agricultural and unprocessed products, and zero per cent for heat, 
electricity and drugs.  The revenue attributable to the five and eight per cent rates represents 
no m ore than one fifth of the total. It is difficult to adm inister differential rates for the VAT, 
especially in an econom y w ith a large unrecorded inform al sector.  
Som e tax specialists justify the low ering of tax rates as a m eans to encourage inform al-
sector activities to becom e part of the registered form al econom y. But such provisions, by 
them selves, are unlikely to provide a sufficient m otivation for such a change. Econom ic grow th 
or the reduction of unnecessary governm ent regulation is likely to be as, if not m ore, im portant.  
The lack of effective adm inistration probably im plies that the VAT is not as progressive as its 
nom inal structure w ould suggest. W hile, in theory, consum ption taxes can be m ade m ore 
progressive, the difficulty of collection m akes it is easier in practice to render a tax system   
m ore progressive by placing m ore w eight on direct taxes on incom e and w ealth.  
Excise taxes represent a significant share of total tax revenue, betw een fifteen and 
eighteen per cent of the total after 2000. But m uch of the revenue that they generate (over forty 
per cent) com es from  taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel.  Another thirty per cent com es from  
taxes on im ported vehicles, and tw elve per cent from  w ine and liquor.  As a ratio to GDP, excise 
taxes conform  to the previous patterns of decline, falling from  4.5 per cent in 1997 to 3.3 in 
2003, largely because of a drop in revenue from  w ine and liquor.  Excise taxes are projected  
to decline even further in com ing years, to 2.2 per cent of GDP in 2007. Boosting revenue by 
levying excise taxes on luxury or non-essential consum ption item s should be a priority of tax 
policy.  The direct im pact on the poor is not likely to be substantial if the item s that are taxed, 
such as im ported vehicles or diesel fuel, are not directly used or consum ed by the poor. 
The governm ent’s strategy for boosting direct taxes is to radically reduce tax rates,  
on the assum ption that such a reduction w ill help broaden the tax base. Such a Neo-liberal 
‘supply-side’ approach to taxation w ill not only dim inish the progressive structure of the tax 
system , but also run the risk of low ering total revenue. This is generally recognised outside  
the governm ent; for exam ple, the IM F has w arned against reducing the rates for direct taxes 
unless other form s of revenue can be generated to offset the potential losses (IM F 2002, p. 13).  
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Various reasons are given for low ering the rates of direct taxes: increasing disposable 
incom e, encouraging inform al-sector activities to becom e registered, and creating a tax haven 
for foreign investm ent.  Low er tax rates can, in theory, have positive incentive effects, but are 
not likely to com pensate fully for a substantial loss of revenue, especially from  a radical and 
sw ift reduction of rates. Such supply-side experim ents have proven them selves to be ineffective 
in other countries (a notable exam ple being the United States in the 1980s and in the early 
2000s). Ballooning governm ent deficits are often the im m ediate and painful result. These 
necessitate inevitable cuts in social protection and essential public services.  
The study of taxation in transition econom ies cited above (Stepanyan 2003) finds that 
low ering the top m arginal tax rates on personal incom e and corporate profits has no discernible 
im pact on increasing tax revenue. There is no reason to believe that savings w ill respond to the 
low ering of tax rates on personal incom e because individuals in countries w ith low  incom es or 
depressed incom es save m ostly for precautionary reasons. The study cannot find any evidence 
that business investm ent has increased because of low ered rates on corporate profits although 
one m ight expect at least som e m odest increase (other factors rem aining constant). Lastly, in 
countries w here unem ploym ent and underem ploym ent are already high, low ered tax rates on 
personal incom e do not induce individuals to supply m ore labour.  
This study tends to put m ore em phasis on sim plifying tax system s, reducing unnecessary 
exem ptions or strengthening adm inistration and com pliance as a basis to raise m ore revenue. 
Since tax rates on personal incom e and corporate profits have already been substantially 
reduced in m any of the transition econom ies, further reductions are m ore likely to have 
negative effects on revenue collection. 
The governm ent has already low ered the tax rate on corporate profits.  This rate w as a 
m oderate tw enty-eight per cent in 2001, falling to tw enty per cent in 2004.  In 2006, w ithin just 
tw o years, it is program m ed to drop to only fifteen per cent. This strategy is designed, in part, 
to induce enterprises to enter the form al econom y and declare their full profit incom es. It is 
also designed to m ake M oldova an attractive tax haven for foreign investors, as allegedly 
happened in Ireland. 
At the sam e tim e that the governm ent sharply low ers the tax rate, it projects in the M TEF 
that corporate tax revenue w ill increase from  10.8 per cent of all revenue in 2004 to 12.2 per 
cent in 2007.  H ow ever, if firm s have successfully avoided a tw enty-eight per cent tax rate, 
there is no guarantee that they w ill abandon such avoidance at a low er rate of fifteen per cent. 
Nor is it certain that foreign investors w ill m ove into M oldova principally because of low  
corporate tax rates.  M ore crucial than the tax rate is the profit opportunities that the econom y 
is generating, w hich in part depend on the ability of the governm ent to use public expenditures, 
especially public investm ent, to stim ulate the econom y. As the econom y grow s and corporate 
profits increase, m oderate rates on profit incom e, such as tw enty-five per cent, should 
represent no significant disincentive to foreign investm ent. 
Part of the problem  w ith collecting corporate incom e tax is the extent of tax exem ptions. 
According to 2003 tax returns, tax exem ptions am ounted to 315 m illion lei, and foreign 
investors received about 50 m illion of this total. About 145 m illion lei in exem ptions w ere 
extended to dom estic corporations to encourage investm ent in fixed assets and construction.  
International experience indicates that such tax incentives usually have a w eak effect on 
private investm ent, and serve m ainly to erode the tax base. 
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The reform s projected for the personal incom e tax are m uch the sam e as for the 
corporate incom e tax.  In 2003, personal incom e up to 12,180 lei w as taxed at a ten per cent 
rate, 12,180-16,200 lei at fifteen per cent, and higher incom e at tw enty five per cent.  The top 
rate reflects a reduction from  the previous high of thirty-tw o per cent.  The intention is that 
by 2007 the tax rate for low  incom es w ill fall to seven per cent, for m edium  incom es to ten 
per cent, and for high incom es to fifteen per cent (see Table 1). 
TABLE 1 
Personal Incom e Tax Rates and Targeted Changes 
Income level 
2003 
Tax rate 
2003 
Income level 
2007 
Tax rate 
2007 
Percentage  
Point Drop 
Low income 10 Low income 7 3 
Middle income 15 Middle income 10 5 
High income 25 High income 15 10 
Source: Republic of M oldova, M TEF 2004. 
 
This change to very low  m arginal rates m akes the system  for direct taxes decidedly less 
progressive. W hile low -incom e persons w ill receive a three percentage points drop in their 
incom e tax rate, m edium -incom e persons w ill benefit by a five percentage points drop, and 
high-incom e persons by ten, m aking the structure considerably less progressive in a country 
w ith high inequality.  In 2003, the ratio of the m iddle-incom e tax rate to the low -incom e rate 
w as 1.5, and that of the high-incom e rate to the low -incom e rate 2.5.  In 2007, the first ratio  
w ill drop to 1.43 and the second to 2.14. These changes w ill w eaken the vertical equity of the 
M oldovan tax system . Those taxpayers w ith a greater ability to pay w ill enjoy relatively low er 
taxes. In relative term s, low er-incom e taxpayers w ill be w orse off. 
If the governm ent reduces its highest m arginal tax rate for personal incom e, this rate w ill  
be w ell below  the com parable rates for m ost other transition econom ies in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the CIS (Table 2). For exam ple, in 2003 the highest m arginal tax rate in Bulgaria w as 
tw enty-nine per cent, in Rom ania forty per cent, and in Slovenia fifty per cent.  Only in Bulgaria 
w ould the highest rate be w ithin tw enty percentage points of M oldova’s.  In W estern Europe the 
m arginal tax rates tended to be higher than those for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS: 
forty-five per cent for Italy, forty-nine per cent for Germ any, and fifty-nine for Denm ark (Table 2). 
Com pared to other countries in the region, M oldova has program m ed a Neo-liberal ‘supply-side’ 
experim ent w ith its tax system  that is m ost likely to be counter-productive. 
Table 2 also indicates that the highest corporate tax rate in M oldova in 2003 w as already 
the low est of the thirteen countries listed.  There are other countries that have chosen the path 
of low  corporate tax rates to attract foreign investm ent.  Ireland has a tax rate of sixteen per 
cent on corporate incom e and Lithuania and M acedonia FYR fifteen per cent. H ow ever, the 
governm ent should carefully study these experim ents in order to determ ine w hether M oldova 
enjoys som e of the sam e advantages as Ireland, and how  successful som e of the countries, such 
as M acedonia FYR, have been.  If M oldova joins the European Union, it w ill need a tax system  
that generates the revenue to finance public expenditures that are com parable to the EU norm .  
M oldova’s entry into the EU w ould be severely underm ined if it w ere view ed by existing 
m em bers as a tax haven to w hich com panies w ould be enticed to relocate. 
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TABLE 2 
H ighest Personal and Corporate M arginal Tax Rates by Country, 2003 (percentages) 
Country Personal  Corporate  
Moldova 2004 25 20 
Moldova  
Projected 2007 
 
15 
 
15 
Bulgaria 29 24 
Poland 40 27 
Romania 40 25 
Slovak Republic 38 25 
Slovenia 50 25 
Ukraine 40 30 
Belgium 50 39 
Denmark 59 30 
Germany 49 27 
Greece 40 35 
Italy 45 34 
Netherlands 52 35 
Source: W orld Developm ent Indicators 2004, Table 5.6. 
 
Reducing the corporate incom e tax rate further, to fifteen per cent, w ould place it w ell 
below  those prevailing in m ost other European and CIS countries.  M oldova could probably 
return its highest m arginal corporate tax rate to tw enty-five per cent, m aintain its highest 
m arginal personal incom e tax rate also at tw enty-five per cent, and still have a tax system  
relatively less progressive than those in m ost other countries in the region. 
The challenge facing the Governm ent is that direct taxes (excluding social and m edical 
insurance contributions) have fallen as a percentage of total revenue since 1997. W hile corporate 
incom e taxes accounted for 8.3 per cent of total revenue in 1997, they fell to 7.7 per cent in 
2003. Sim ilarly, personal incom e taxes fell from  9.6 per cent to 8.3 per cent betw een 1997  
and 2003.  Given these declines, it is ill advised to low er tax rates on personal and corporate 
incom es. This study recom m ends that the 2003 structure for personal incom e taxation 
(nam ely, rates of 10, 15 and 25 per cent) be m aintained, and that corporate profit taxes be 
returned to tw enty-five per cent. This w ould contribute to a sustainable fiscal structure 
consistent w ith grow th and poverty reduction. 
W ealth taxes, such as real estate and land taxes, have also declined in M oldova. Together, 
real estate and land taxes fell from  1.3 per cent of GDP in 1999 to 0.7 in 2003. As the econom y 
grow s and asset values increase, revenues from  w ealth taxes should increase in im portance. 
This depends on better registration and m ore m arket-based valuation of property, w hich the 
governm ent is attem pting to im plem ent.  It also depends on raising property tax rates. Such 
an effort could m ake the entire tax system  m ore progressive, since property taxes 
disproportionately affect richer households.  
Options w orthy of serious consideration are concerted efforts to register and tax urban 
real estate and raise land taxes on large farm ing enterprises. The governm ent has considered 
raising land taxes as a substitute for other form s of taxes, such as on farm  incom es or agricultural 
products. This policy should be evaluated, in its ow n right, as an efficient m eans of raising 
revenue and shifting m ore of the incidence onto richer households.  Land taxes are typically  
a m ore efficient m ethod for raising revenue than taxes on farm  incom es, w hich are m ore 
difficult to m easure. 
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In sum m ary, the governm ent should concentrate on raising m ore tax revenue and doing 
so w ith a m ore progressive structure, instead of risking loss of revenue as a result of m aking 
the tax structure less vertically equitable.  To this end, the governm ent could initiate a 
concerted effort to strengthen the efficiency of the VAT, w hich it has chosen as the m ainstay  
of its tax system , and ensure that its im pact is indeed progressive.  In order to guarantee the 
buoyancy of the tax system  as average per capita incom es continue to rise, the governm ent 
should m aintain its current rate structure for personal incom e. Also, the rate on corporate 
profit incom e should return to tw enty-five per cent to m ake it consistent w ith the top rate  
for personal incom e.  
In the nam e of m aking the tax system  m ore efficient, m any orthodox tax reform ers have 
sacrificed progressivity and w eakened prospects for raising revenue. The justification is that 
the tax base w ill be broadened if tax rates are low ered, especially for high-incom e earners. The 
base for taxation is m ore likely to be broadened, how ever, by sustained and broad-based 
econom ic grow th and im proved tax adm inistration than by the low ering of corporate and 
personal incom e rates. 
3  EXTERNAL AND  INTERNAL D EBT BURD EN 
The governm ent of M oldova continues to bear a substantial external debt burden that 
constrains its ability to allocate public revenue to stim ulate grow th and reduce poverty. The 
external debt is a tragic legacy of its early transition period, w hen its average incom e dropped 
precipitously to the level of a low -incom e country w hile international financial institutions did 
not offer it concessional term s for lending. 
In 1992, the external public debt w as only US$16.5 m illion; but by 1997 it had ballooned 
to over US$ 709 m illion (Table 3). It reached a peak of US$ 781 m illion in 2000.  Since 2000, the 
governm ent has w orked to reduce this burden.  It attem pted to buy back, at large discounts, 
debt ow ed to Russia’s Gazprom , the H ew lett Packard corporation, and Eurobond holders. At 
the sam e tim e, it sought to reschedule com m ercial credits held by banks and the rem aining 
Eurobonds, and reschedule the debts ow ed to bilateral creditors that w ere not part of the Paris 
Club.  As a result, external debt fell to about US$ 672 m illion in 2004, w hich w as 25.7 per cent of 
M oldova’s GDP.  The governm ent paid a high price in term s of allocating funds to debt reduction 
that could have been used to stim ulate econom ic grow th and foster poverty reduction. This 
trade-off w as probably unavoidable in view  of the constraints, and the governm ent can be 
congratulated on its success in reducing the debt to m ore m anageable proportions. 
TABLE 3 
External Public D ebt, 1992-2004 (M illion US$) 
Year Total debt Year Total debt 
1992 16.5 1999 663.3 
1993 188.5 2000 781.3 
1994 345.1 2001 699.8 
1995 401.3 2002 724.3 
1996 540.2 2003 751.4 
1997 709.1 2004 671.7 
1998 719.6   
Source: Governm ent of M oldova, M inistry of Finance. 
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In the w ake of governm ent’s efforts, m ultilateral institutions now  hold sixty-three per cent 
of M oldova’s external debt, and bilateral lenders thirty-three per cent. The rem aining five per 
cent is com m ercial debt.  M oldova w ill continue to bear a substantial debt burden as long as 
the International M onetary Fund does not reach agreem ent w ith the governm ent on a Poverty 
Reduction and Grow th Facility. W ithout such an agreem ent, the governm ent cannot begin 
negotiations w ith the Bretton W oods Institutions on its m ultilateral debt nor start negotiations 
on its Paris Club bilateral debt.  
The governm ent has secured tem porary breathing room  by accum ulating debt arrears 
and rescheduling its Eurobond debt. For full and tim ely paym ent in 2002, it w ould have been 
necessary to allocate sixty-tw o per cent of total public revenue to debt servicing; but the actual 
allocation w as lim ited to tw enty-eight per cent. It should be clear that a burden of over sixty 
per cent w as unacceptably large, given the other claim s on public revenue.  In 2003, full debt 
servicing w ould have taken half of public revenue, in contrast to the tw enty-three per cent that 
w as actually allocated.  As a result, total arrears to external creditors rose from  US$ 3.4 m illion 
in 2000 to US$ 69.9 m illion in 2003.  Since its m ultilateral and large bilateral creditors refused 
to renegotiate their loans, the governm ent had no alternative to accum ulating arrears, unless 
it had instituted draconian cuts in social expenditure.  In 2004, the governm ent m anaged to 
clear m ost of these arrears through rescheduling or buyback arrangem ents w ith non-Paris 
Club m em bers, m ultilateral creditors and Eurobond holders. 
Once negotiations on the m ultilateral debt begin, the governm ent has a strong case to 
argue that such debt, m istakenly set on IBRD term s, should be refinanced to reflect m ore 
favourable IDA  term s. One 2001 estim ate calculated the savings on interest paym ents alone  
at US$ 157 m illion (Olortegui 2001). The governm ent can also seek rescheduling of its bilateral 
Paris Club debt, and use the new  term s for this debt as a basis to renegotiate its rem aining 
com m ercial debt.  
In present value term s, M oldova’s external debt represented 126 per cent of its exports in 
2002 (Table 4). This places it in the ranks of other low -incom e transition econom ies (Arm enia, 
Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, M ongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) that have a substantial external 
debt burden.  W hile such a debt burden severely ham pers a country’s ability to accelerate 
econom ic grow th, alm ost none of these countries qualify as ‘severely indebted’ under the H IPC 
definition. Only Kyrgyz Republic, w ith a debt-to-export ratio of 221 per cent, w ould qualify.  
The debt problem s of this group of low -incom e countries have received scant attention. 
Despite prom ises, the international developm ent agencies have not launched initiatives to 
significantly relieve the debt burdens of these transition countries although such an initiative 
should be a priority. 
Faced w ith the intransigent policies of m ultilateral and bilateral creditors, the M oldovan 
governm ent w as forced to find its ow n solutions. It m anaged to pay off its trade credits, 
renegotiate its Eurobond debt, and conclude agreem ents on bilateral debts w ith Rom ania and 
Turkey. It is not w ithout irony that such countries have been m ore generous in debt relief than 
m uch richer countries. The governm ent also bought back its RAO Gazprom  debt ow ed to the 
Russian Federation, retiring US$ 15 m illion of an outstanding debt of US$ 111 m illion, and 
bought back its debt to H ew lett Packard, w orth US$ 10-20 m illion.  The buyback term s have 
been at slightly over forty per cent of nom inal value.  
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TABLE 4 
D ebt-to-Export Ratios of Selected Low -Incom e Transition Econom ies 
Country Debt/Exports Debt classification 
Armenia 111 L 
Georgia 144 M 
Kyrgyz Rep 221 S 
Moldova 126 M 
Mongolia 107 M 
Tajikistan 124 S 
Uzbekistan 136 M 
Source: W orld Developm ent Indicators 2004, Table 4.17. ‘L’ (less indebted); ‘M ’ (m oderately indebted); 
‘S’ (Severely Indebted). 
 
Despite the absence of support from  international financial agencies, the governm ent  
has succeeded in m aking its total debt burden, both external and dom estic, m ore m anageable.  
In 2004, its total public debt represented about thirty-seven per cent of GDP, dow n from  fifty-
seven per cent in 2002 (Table 5). The decline in external debt, from  44.4 per cent in 2002 to 
25.7 per cent in 2004, accounted for alm ost all of the fall in total debt.  
TABLE 5 
Total State D ebt, External and D om estic (%  of GD P) 
Type of debt 2002 2003 2004 2007 (Projected) 
Domestic debt 12.5 10.7 11.5 8.3 
External debt 44.4 36.4 25.7 25.9 
Total debt 56.9 47.1 37.2 34.2 
Source: Republic of M oldova, M TEF 2004 and M inistry of Finance. 
 
Once discussions w ith its Paris Club bilateral creditors and its m ultilateral creditors begin, 
the governm ent should be in a stronger position than previously to negotiate debt relief or 
refinancing. Russia, a Paris Club m em ber, is M oldova’s largest creditor, follow ed by the United 
States.  Germ any, Italy and Japan hold relatively sm all outstanding loans.  Som e relief on 
m ultilateral debt is appropriate since M oldova w as forced to accept com m ercial term s on its 
borrow ing w hen it should have received concessional term s.  M oldova becam e eligible for 
concessional term s only in 1997, w ell after its deep econom ic crisis.   
In order to finance its budget gap in the 1990s, w hich w as generated prim arily by external 
debt servicing, the governm ent had little alternative but to increase dom estic debt. This 
causality, nam ely, the external debt burden forcing m ore dom estic debt at high interest 
rates, em phasises the problem atical nature of the original IBRD-term s loans that did not 
create assets that w ould generate an incom e stream  to repay them . The governm ent has 
subsequently reduced the dom estic debt, from  12.5 per cent of GDP in 2002 to 11.5 in 2004, and 
projects a further reduction to 8.3 per cent in 2007.  This w ould be accom plished by reducing 
security issues, lengthening the m aturities, and repaying outstanding credits to the National 
Bank of M oldova.  Dom estic debt becam e a serious problem  during the Russian financial 
crisis w hen the governm ent w as forced to borrow  from  the central bank in order to finance 
the expenditures that w ere not covered by revenue. In 1998, the dom estic debt had hit a 
peak of 17.2 per cent of GDP. 
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Receipts from  privatisation have not been and w ill not be adequate to reduce the dom estic 
debt.  There are few  state-ow ned assets to be privatized; and, in any case, it is not clear w hether 
privatisation w ould be the best option.  M ore successful has been the lengthening of the 
m aturity of m any of the governm ent’s dom estic securities from  1-2 years to 3-4 years.  In late 
2004, there w as an unexpected surge in dem and for governm ent T-bills, perhaps due to 
rem ittances, even though their interest yield w as below  the inflation rate. A s long as the 
m aturities of securities lengthen and the dem and for them  m aintains itself, servicing the 
dom estic debt should be m anageable.  The problem  is that such financing is being used,  
in effect, to reduce the external debt instead of financing dom estic public investm ent. 
A  significant rem aining debt problem  is caused by m ore expensive energy im ports  
from  Gazprom , a privately ow ned Russian com pany.  This debt had its origins in 1994, w hen 
Gazprom  raised its gas prices to w orld levels and began charging m ore for its gas supplies  
to M oldova Gas, w hich is also a private com pany.  Because the governm ent refused, on equity 
grounds, to raise user prices to households and also to som e productive activities, it began to 
incur large losses.  A s a result, the governm ent found it necessary to assum e the debt ow ed to 
Gazprom  (w hich rose to 11.2 per cent of GDP in 1994).  This debt increased alarm ingly in 1998 
and 1999, reaching a peak of 39.1 per cent of GDP in 1999.  Since 1999, the governm ent has 
reduced this ratio, dow n to 14.5 per cent of GDP in 2003.  H ow ever, this percentage rem ains  
a substantial financial burden on the governm ent. 
In sum m ary, the governm ent has m anaged to bring its external and dom estic debts under 
control.  It has done so at a high cost—one that could have been substantially lessened had 
official lenders been m ore forthcom ing w ith assistance.  The Bretton W oods Institutions could 
have easily been m ore generous in their dealings w ith M oldova.  They delayed approval of the 
Econom ic Grow th and Poverty Reduction Strategy until late 2004, and w hen the endorsem ent 
cam e, it did not allow  for access to key concessionary instrum ents.  Should full support be 
received, especially from  the IM F, the governm ent could seek reduction and rescheduling  
of the external debt ow ed to m ultilateral institutions and Paris Club bilateral creditors.  
Since the governm ent has endured m uch of the pain in reducing the com m ercial and 
non-Paris Club bilateral com ponents of its external debt, it should be in a stronger position  
to lobby for favourable term s for rescheduling the rem aining part. The starting point for such 
negotiations is the general recognition that M oldova should have been provided w ith 
concessional lending, instead of non-concessional lending, beginning w ith the first loans it 
contracted in the early 1990s.  Thus, the accum ulated interest rate differential betw een the 
tw o should im m ediately be forgiven. In addition to the interest resulting from  the difference 
betw een IBRD and IDA  term s, the m aturities of the non-concessional debt should im m ediately 
be rescheduled.  The result w ould be that the net present value of M oldova’s debt should drop 
substantially, facilitating the prospects for grow th, em ploym ent and poverty reduction. 
This study recom m ends that negotiations resum e on no w orse than H ouston term s, 
w ith the applicable rescheduling and grace periods for repaym ent and interest rates.  Such 
term s, it should be noted, are hardly generous.  Reaching a settlem ent w ould be in the 
interests of both the governm ent of M oldova and its creditors, and serve the com m itm ent  
of both to grow th, em ploym ent and poverty reduction.  It w ould benefit the M oldovan 
people because funds that have been earm arked for debt servicing could be released to 
finance badly needed public investm ent in econom ic and social infrastructure and the 
provision of essential public services. 
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4  TH E CO M PO SITIO N O F PUBLIC EXPEND ITURES 
As stated above, the governm ent of M oldova has im plem ented a relatively tight fiscal policy, 
w ith a deficit near zero during 2001-2002.  In 2003, it ran a surplus of 1.6 per cent of GDP.  
Taking into account expenditures for the social insurance and m edical insurance funds, total 
public expenditures w ere, according to the M TEF, 33.8 per cent of GDP in 2003. The ratio of 
current expenditures to GDP rose during 2000-2003, to a peak of 27.2 per cent (Table 6), and  
is projected to rise further to 29.6 per cent in 2007 (Table 7). Conversely, the ratio of capital 
expenditures to GDP is slated to decline from  5.1 per cent in 2000 to three per cent in 2007 
(Table 7). This does not bode w ell for sustained econom ic grow th in M oldova because public 
investm ent can be a pow erful stim ulus to private investm ent. M oreover, its absence tends to 
depress private investm ent.  
Part of the problem  is that one third of public capital expenditures have been financed  
by external grants. But M oldova has no Public Investm ent Program m e to rationalize these 
investm ents.  In order to advance national developm ent priorities, public investm ent should 
be reliant on the m obilization of dom estic revenues. This depends in turn on the m obilization 
of dom estic savings, w hich rem ain very low  in M oldova. Beyond revenue generation, there is a 
m ore general problem  of the lack of dom estic accum ulation of capital, both private and public, 
w hich is a foundation for long-term  grow th.   
M oldova’s heavy reliance on external assistance to finance public investm ent contributes 
to the fragm entation and lack of coherence of public investm ent, w hich is partly driven  
by dom estic priorities and partly by donor priorities. M oldova needs a consolidated and 
coordinated Public Investm ent Program m e that is m ore am bitious, m ore geared to investing 
in grow th and em ploym ent and m ore focused on poverty reduction.  
TABLE 6 
Com position of Public Expenditures (%  of GD P) 
Expenditure Category 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 (approved) 
Total Expenditures 36.4 31.4 33.9 33.8 34.9 
Debt Service 6.4 4.2 2.2 2.1 2.9 
Net Lending -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 
Current Expenditures 25.1 23.8 27.1 27.2 28.1 
Capital Expenditures 5.1 3.6 5.0 4.6 4.0 
Source: Republic of M oldova, M TEF 2004. 
 
An additional problem  is that not all of the capital investm ent that is allocated in  
the budget ends up being disbursed.  In 2003, only sixty-one per cent of allocated public 
investm ent funds w ere disbursed (IDIS Viitorul 2004, p. 25).  A  further problem  is that Chisinau 
received about seventy per cent of all capital investm ent (Ibid, p. 25), leaving rural areas, w here 
infrastructure is sorely lacking, w ith a sm all share of the total. 
The public sector w age bill is not a m ajor factor in increasing current expenditures: it is 
projected to increase only slightly, from  7.7 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 8.1 per cent in 2007.  
Betw een 1998 and 2002, there w as a fifteen per cent reduction in the num ber of em ployees, 
w ith eighty per cent of this reduction com prising em ployees in education and health. This is 
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surely not a pro-poor approach to public sector reform . H ow ever, the governm ent did raise 
the w ages of these low -incom e em ployees.  Nonetheless, overall w ages in the public sector 
rem ain low . 
Other sm all categories, such as subsidies to enterprises, are expected to decline or rem ain 
roughly constant in com ing years.  Tw o categories expected to increase are the general 
expenditures on goods and services and social transfers.  Expenditures for m edical insurance 
w ent from  zero in 2003 to 3.5 percent of GDP in 2004. This is the m ain explanation for the 
projected rise in expenditures on goods and services from  5.9 per cent in 2002 to 8.5 per cent 
in 2007.  The projected increase in social transfers from  8.8 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 11.0 per 
cent in 2007 is explained by the rise in its m ajor subcategory, social insurance expenditures, 
from  8.2 per cent to 9.7 per cent.   
TABLE 7 
Current and Capital Expenditures (%  of GD P) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2006 (Proj.) 
2007 
(Proj.) 
Current 
Expenditure 25.1 23.8 27.1 27.2 29.7 29.6 
Capital 
Expenditure 5.1 3.6 5.0 4.6 3.3 3.0 
Total Expenditure 36.4 31.4 33.9 33.8 35.0 34.3 
Source: Republic of M oldova, M TEF 2004. 
 
Juxtaposing the increases in expenditures for social and m edical insurance w ith the decline 
in capital expenditures highlights current budget priorities. The governm ent has been forced  
to favour social protection and w elfare over grow th-inducing public investm ent because of the 
disastrous collapse of social provision in the 1990s.  The low  capital expenditure is due partly to  
a projected decline in external grants and credits for capital expenditures. H ow ever, if external 
assistance increases, it is likely to favour, in line w ith com m on donor priorities, expenditures on 
health and education rather than on econom ic services and investm ent.  The official intention  
of the governm ent is to m aintain a constant level of dom estic financing of public investm ent 
during 2005-2007, and direct m uch of it to critically needed construction activities. H ow ever, the 
general dow nw ard trend of financing for investm ent portends a governm ent focus on the short-
run am elioration of poverty instead of its long-run substantial reduction.  
An exam ination of trends in expenditures on social and econom ic services during 2000-2004 
underscores the relative neglect of the econom ic services.  Expenditures on both education and 
health increased during this period (Table 8).  By contrast, expenditures on agriculture, transport 
and com m unication edged dow nw ard.  Overall, the share of social services in GDP increased 
from  19.6 per cent to 21.3 per cent w hile the share of econom ic services declined from  4.3 to 4.0 
percent.  Econom ic services are program m ed to decline further, to 3.2 per cent in 2007, w hile 
social services w ill rem ain virtually constant at 21.4 per cent.2 
Given the im portance of agriculture and agro-industry to future pro-poor grow th, the  
lack of expenditures on econom ic services for the sector, particularly public investm ent, is  
not optim al. M oreover, the lack of public investm ent in infrastructure for transport, 
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com m unication and energy im plies an erosion of the basis for long-term  sustainable grow th.  
Rural and agricultural infrastructure is essential for M oldova’s industrial developm ent as w ell as 
its agricultural developm ent.  Even com pared to neighbouring transition econom ies, M oldova 
is allocating relatively less attention to econom ic services and relatively m ore to social services.  
W hile this is due in part to the depth of the recession that the country has endured, such an 
allocation of public resources suggests that the full recovery from  such a catastrophic decline 
w ill be m ore protracted than anticipated. 
TABLE 8 
Public Expenditures by Sector (percent of GD P) 
Budget 
Category 2000 2001 2002 2003 
2004 
(Appr’d) 
General Services 5.0 4.9 6.0 5.9 5.8 
Social Services 19.6 18.1 21.2 21.2 21.3 
-  Education   5.7   6.0   6.8   6.7   6.4 
-  Health   3.2   3.2   4.0   4.0   4.5 
-  Social Assistance   10.0   8.4   9.6   9.7   9.8 
Economic Services 4.3 3.2 3.7 3.7 4.0 
-  Agriculture     1.3   0.6   0.8   1.1   1.0 
-  Transp. &Commun.     0.9   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.8 
-  Communal Services     0.9   1.3   1.7   1.3   1.1 
Source: Republic of M oldova, M TEF 2004. 
5  CO NCLUD ING REM ARKS 
This Country Study has analysed M oldova’s public finances, covering the topics of revenue 
generation, debt relief and expenditure allocation. One of its m ajor objectives is to help the 
governm ent expand ‘fiscal space’ to prom ote grow th, em ploym ent and poverty reduction. 
H ow ever, by follow ing the standard Neo-liberal advice often dispensed by international 
financial institutions, the governm ent has been im plem enting fiscal reform s that are, by 
contrast, ham pering its ability to m obilize and effectively disburse public resources.  
H ence, this study takes issue w ith the governm ent’s current efforts to dram atically low er 
rates on direct taxes. The study predicts that these reform s w ill not only w eaken the vertical 
equity of M oldova’s tax system  but also prove to be ineffectual in raising public revenue. 
H ence, it offers a series of alternative recom m endations, covering both indirect and direct 
taxes, on how  to raise m ore revenue and m ake the tax system  m ore progressive. 
The study notes that the governm ent of M oldova has succeeded rem arkably in 
unilaterally reducing its external debt burden, but at trem endous cost—nam ely, not being 
able to safeguard or advance the w ell-being of its ow n citizens. In this regard, the study 
pointedly criticizes international donors for m aking the m istake of not offering the country 
concessional lending during the w renching years of its transition during the 1990s.  
Blind to the real condition of the country, international financial institutions calculated 
M oldova’s GDP per capita to be higher than it w as. But, during the early 1990s, the country had 
plum m eted, in fact, to the level of a low -incom e country. Such a m istake created a m uch larger 
external debt burden for M oldova w hen it had to borrow  internationally to try to m itigate  
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the w idespread m isery due to its deep recession. The study urges m ultilateral and bilateral 
creditors to rectify this gross m istake and reschedule M oldova’s debt, taking into account  
the additional, and unnecessary, burden that the country shouldered w hen it had to resort to 
borrow ing at interest rates closer to m arket levels. 
The study also recom m ends that w hile the governm ent should continue devoting 
resources to social protection, especially since incom es rem ain low , it should disproportionately 
allocate resources to econom ic services, precisely in order to stim ulate m ore grow th of incom es. 
The study em phasises the im portance, in general, of public investm ent, w hich can expand the 
productive capacity of the econom y as w ell as stim ulate aggregate dem and. W ell-designed 
public infrastructure can prom ote m ore private investm ent and, thus, play a central role in 
generating m ore grow th and em ploym ent and reducing w idespread poverty in M oldova. 
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NO TES 
 
1. If social and m edical insurance contributions are added to the calculations, the total revenue to GDP ratio w as 31.5 
per cent in 2003, and projected to be 31.9 per cent in 2007.   
2. Public investm ent trends reflect the general priorities accorded to social services. In 2003, for exam ple, w hen public 
investm ent w as 4.6 per cent of GDP, a 13.5 per cent share w as allocated to agriculture. For the sam e year, 11.6 per 
cent w as allocated to healthcare and 17 per cent to education. H ence, together health and education accounted  
for 28.6 per cent of all public investm ent. Another 11.5 per cent w ent to com m unity services and housing. 
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